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Abstract  
Van Fraassen bases his alternative to scientific realism, constructive empiricism, on a dichotomy 
between  the  observable  and  the  unobservable.  This  paper  argues  that  the  implications  of  the 
dichotomy regarding microscopy can not be made to stand, and that the dichotomy might even be 
unnecessary to set forward the epistemic attitudes  of constructive empiricism. 
1 Introduction 
Since the breakdown of the theoretical  terms/observational terms dichotomy (theory/observation 
dichotomy),  (entity)  realists  made their case for the possibility of observing what under logical 
positivism were seen as theoretical terms. For example, Grover Maxwell (1962) considers that due 
to the impossibility of making a clear theory/observation distinction  (since according to Maxwell 
there is a continuous transition from observable to unobservable) we cannot consider 'electron' to be 
a theoretical term. Regarding the theory/observation distinction van Fraassen considers that we can 
separate the discussion in two issues:  “Can we divide our language into a theoretical  and non-
theoretical  part?  On  the  other  hand,  can  we  classify  objects  and  events  into  observable  and 
unobservable ones? ” (van Fraassen 1980, 14).
Van Fraassen accepts the consolidated view that the answer to the first question is negative, but 
by disentangling from it the second question he can give a positive answer to this question enabling 
him to promote a new dichotomy that, like the previous one before, can be used, for example, as a 
barrier to the scientific realist belief in the existence of electrons.   With his new dichotomy van 
Fraassen  has  the  instrument  to  promote  an  anti-realist  position.  Theories  only  need  to  save 
observable regularities, in this case they have empirical  adequacy. This does not imply that  the 
scientific image we are immersed in when accepting a theory has ontological significance regarding 
the unobservable aspects of the world; we can be agnostic, since the “immersion in the theoretical 
world-picture does not preclude 'bracketing' its ontological implications” (van Fraassen 1980, 81); 
also to van Fraassen this dichotomy has implications regarding our epistemic attitudes: it suggests 
that our knowledge is limited: “the amount of belief involved in [a theory] acceptance is typically 
less according to anti-realism” (van Fraassen 1980, 13).
2 Letting go of the observable/unobservable dichotomy
Van  Fraassen  rejects  Maxwell's  argument,  because  Maxwell  does  not  justifies  the  supposed 
“continuous series beginning with looking through a vacuum and containing these as members: 
looking though a windowpane, looking though glasses, looking through binoculars, looking through 
a low-power microscope, looking through a high-power microscope, etc.” (Maxwell 2009 [1962], 
453). Van Fraassen considers that even if observable is a vague predicate due to the fact that it is not 
possible to draw the line between the observable and the unobservable clearly, this does not imply 
that the dichotomy is meaningless. According to him the dichotomy is tenable if we can present 
clear examples of observable and unobservable things, events, etc. To van Fraassen the moons of 
Jupiter are observable, not because we can see them using a telescope, but because an astronaut 
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could  see  them  directly.  It  is  this  seeing  with  the  naked  eye  (or  other  non-aided  modes  of 
perception) that van Fraassen calls observation. To him an electron (if existing) is not observable. 
An important contra-argumentation was made by Ian Hacking, which put forward, in particular, 
the so-called argument of the grid. In it, a barely visible disc of metal is supposed to be engraved 
with an unobservable square grid with a letter in each square. According to Hacking, “we look at 
the tiny disc through almost any kind of microscope and see exactly the same shapes and letters as 
were  originally  drawn on  a  large  scale”  (Hacking 1983,  203);  and  why is  that?  According to 
Hacking, “I know what I see through the microscope is veridical because we made the grid to be 
just that way. I know that the process of manufacture is reliable, because we can check the results 
with the microscope” (Hacking 1983, 203). Van Fraassen dismisses Hacking's argument due to its 
circularity (van Fraassen 1985, 297-8). 
What is missing in Hacking's account of microscopy is the key operational procedure called  
calibration. Loosely speaking, to calibrate an instrument is to follow an operational procedure that 
makes the instrument work in a similar way to another for a particular range.  One example of 
calibration is that of different thermometers, so that they give the same temperature reading in a 
overlapping temperature range (Chang 2004). The same goes with microscopes. In this case  the 
microscopic grid (that we see with a light microscope) is used for the calibration of the electron  
microscope. As William Seager called the attention to, the microscopic grid is used first of all
for the detection and correction of aberrations in the [electron] microscope. That is, the electron lens of a microscope is 
adjusted to give the perfect grid appearance, and once the image looks sufficiently rectilinear, the microscope ... is 
pronounced fit for service. The grid is then used to calibrate the microscope so that accurate size measurements of new 
images are possible. (Seager  1995, 466) 
In simple terms, if we are confident on the workings of the light microscope we can calibrate the 
electron microscope to it.  And how can we be confident on the light  microscope?  Because we 
calibrate the optical microscope to our vision. In this way, Maxwell's intuition of a continuous series 
was in part  right:  when considering a series of  calibration procedures,  it  is  possible to give a  
meaningful notion of a  'continuous series' that goes from naked eye perception to aided perception  
with a series of instruments. It is the calibration that creates the 'continuous series'. 
 Contrary to van Fraassen's view it is relevant that it is not possible to draw the line between the 
observable and the unobservable clearly. It is true that while we can see the hind end of an ant there 
is  a  point  beyond  which  we  cannot  distinguish  details  of  the  structure  without  the  optical 
microscope. But, there is a range in which we can check what we see with the optical microscope  
with what we see with the naked eye. Van Fraassen does not provide an argument that shows there to 
be  a  relevant  difference  between  the  smaller  structural  feature  a  member  of  the  epistemic 
community can distinguish and a more detailed view of these structural features only seen with the 
optical microscope.  Since there is no convincing argument to the contrary, I consider that when  
calibrating the optical microscope to our vision we extend our visual range into a domain beyond  
normal human capacity (i.e. into what van Fraassen includes in the category of unobservable).
This result does not have to imply that  van Fraassen's dichotomy is in danger. One only needs 
to take the diffuse line between observable and unobservable to be beyond the last link (instrument) 
in the calibration series.  Regarding van Fraassen's  views of 'electrons' as unobservable-to-us,  it 
seems that even granting that one sees with the help of an electron microscope, one does not sees 
'electrons'. The most one could say, following entity realists, is that for example one is detecting 
electrons using a cloud chamber; after all we do not see with a cloud chamber (van Fraassen 1980, 
17). 
One could ask: why did van Fraassen come up with the idea that one does not see with the help 
of a microscope in the first place, since one cannot expect to use microscopes to see, e.g., electrons? 
I think the answer is in Maxwell's original argument of the continuum, in which Maxwell does not 
make any distinction between seeing and detecting, giving the impression that there is a 'continuous 
2
series' that goes all the way from seeing apples to the detection of electrons.  This confusion was 
made  possible  due  to  the  fact  that  neither  Maxwell  nor  van  Fraassen  took  into  account  the 
calibration of scientific instruments, which gives us criteria to distinguish between instrumental  
aids to our vision (for example microscopes,  which are calibrated between them) and different  
classes of instruments (like thermometers, which are calibrated between them). 
It would seem that when accepting that we see with microscopes one only has to rephrase van 
Fraassen's views, by making a fine-tuning in the words we use to define the dichotomy. Instead of 
just using the terms 'observable' and 'unobservable', one should give more details, making explicit 
the difference between 'observable (even if with the aid of microscopes)' and 'detectable (i.e. not 
observable with the aid of microscopes, but 'indirectly' detectable using complex instrumentation)'. 
We could even leave out the word 'unobservable', and talk about things, processes, and so on, that 
are observable or only detectable. 
In setting forward his dichotomy, van Fraassen is playing the game of realists and accepts that 
putative  entities  postulated  in  some realist  readings  of  physical  theories  can  be  classified  as 
unobservable-to-us (following the realist's own prescription according to which the electrons can 
only be detected and not observed); then, from this perspective he argues for epistemic limitations 
to  the  realist's  claims  by  using  the  metaphysical  categories  of  the  realist  (i.e.  observable  and 
unobservable).  However  one  might  ask:  is  it  really  necessary to  use,  even  if  agnostically,  the 
realists'  metaphysics to promote a particular anti-realist epistemic attitude; i.e.  is it  not  possible 
within constructive empiricism to promote the attitude without implicit resort to this metaphysics?
I think one can promote basically the epistemic attitude being proposed by van Fraassen when 
starting from a criticism of entity realism, without having to resort to the dichotomy emerging from 
realism. This can be achieved by considering van Fraassen's own views on experimentation and 
physical theories. In The Scientific Image, van Fraassen presents what to some entity realists is an 
experiment to measure the electric charge of the electron as “filling in a value for a quantity which, 
in the construction of the theory, was so far left open” (van Fraassen 1980, 77).  To van Fraassen, 
Millikan's experiment does not consist in measuring/detecting a property of a putative unobservable  
entity; on the contrary, to him we assist to “the continuation of theory construction by other means” 
(van Fraassen 1980, 77). For the case being made here the important point is that van Fraassen can 
give  an  account  of  the  experiments  without  any need to  accept  a  realist  view dependent  on a 
putative unobservable: if we do not need 'detectable' in our account of physical experimentation, we 
also do not need the putative unobservable that we detect, i.e. if we are doing something different  
from detecting some unobservable-to-us, we do not need to take stock in the idea of unobservable.
Thus, by following van Fraassen's own account of experimentation we find it difficult to justify 
a particular epistemic attitude developed in terms of the observable/unobservable dichotomy, since 
without the idea of 'detection' we lose one side of the dichotomy, the 'unobservable'.
With this view on experimentation we have an argument, that does not play the game of realist 
metaphysics, to promote a similar epistemic attitude to the one being proposed by van Fraassen on 
account  of  the dichotomy:  there  is  no detection,  and so there is  nothing (unobservable)  being  
detected; there is only the (observed-)phenomena; a theory is accepted if it has empirical adequacy,  
i.e.  if  it  saves  the  (observed-)phenomena.   Thus,  by  following  van  Fraassen's  views  on 
experimentation we have the means to  establish epistemic limitations  to what  the entity realist 
proposes without any need for the observable/unobservable dichotomy.
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